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Abstract
With the continuing growth of the use of the Internet for business purposes, the consequences
of a possible cyber attack that could create a large scale outage of long time duration becomes
a more and more serious economic issue. In this paper, we construct a game-theoretic model
that addresses the economic motivations for investment in added Internet security and makes
a case for a possible market failure in the form of underinvestment in the provision of Internet
security. This result relies on the fact that the social value derived from consumption (which is
at least equal to a fraction of the surplus derived from e-commerce) greatly exceeds the revenue
at stake associated with the telecommunications companies’ and ISP’s security levels. If the
ratio of social value to revenue at stake to Internet providers continues to grow, the likelihood of
underinvestment in security becomes higher and some form of regulation may become necessary.
We discuss the difficulties associated with designing and enforcing a regulatory scheme based
upon mandatory security standards.
Keywords: Internet Security, Market Failure, Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium, Markov Perfect
Equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
With the continuing growth of the use of the Internet for business purposes1, the consequences
of a possible cyber attack that could create a large scale outage of long time duration becomes
a more and more serious economic issue. Two recent cyber security events have raised concerns
about the risks of a large-scale, possibly long lasting cyber attack on the Internet (see Garza (2005)
and Zetter (2005)). These events were: 1) CISCO communications router software was stolen,
recognizing that CISCO routers constitute 70% of Internet routers, and 2) a subsequent technology
demonstration of a cyber attack (based on knowledge of that software) that could tamper with
messages going through routers. The possibility of creating an important Internet outage raises
the question of how long would it take to restore such an outage. In 1998, ATT had reported an
incident involving a software flaw that affected its frame-relay network, causing a service disruption.
This event required restoration of a number of switches through a software patch. ATT indicated
that complete restoration required 26 hours (see ATT (1998)). While it is speculation, one can
readily imagine that restoration of a large segment of the Internet, involving a number of service
providers and telecommunications companies, would likely take much longer. This confluence
of growing consequences and plausible scenarios of cyber attacks with significant macro-economic
consequences raises questions about investment in added cyber security in response to the growing
risk, recognizing that the Internet is part of the nation’s critical infrastructure.
In 2003, the President’s National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (see White House (2003)) stated
that government action is warranted where alleged “market failures result in underinvestment in
cyber security”. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence and/or theoretical support for such
“market failure”. While there exists a large body of technical literature on cyber security, research
on the economics of cyber security is still on its very early stages (see for instance, Anderson
(2001), Cave and Mason (2001), Gordon and Loeb (2002), Kannan and Telang (2005) and Gal-Or
and Ghose (2005)).
This paper provides a game-theoretic model that addresses the economic motivations for investment
in added Internet security and makes a case for a possible market failure in the form of underin-
vestment in the provision of Internet security. While investments in security by Internet Service
Providers (ISP’s) and telecommunications companies are in a sense, “unproductive” (i.e. no new
value is created), they have a strategic dimension: a firm that has been subject to successful cyber
attacks may see its market share negatively affected, as some customers may switch to another ser-
vice provider. In our model, an ISP with a higher level of security is able to earn a higher expected
revenue. However, the expected revenue gains resulting from investments in security, decrease as
1According to the US Census Bureau, for the second quarter of 2005, e-commerce retail sales amounted to $21.1
billion, roughly 2.2% of all retail sales (see US Census Bureau (2005)).
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competitors increase their security levels.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we develop a simple, but illuminating, strategic
model for investments in cyber security that are motivated by competition for revenue. In section
3, this model is extended to account for the continuing depreciation of cyber security defenses
due to the continuing advancements in exploitation software. In section 4, we identify conditions
under which equilibrium investments differ from the socially optimal level of investment. This
result relies on the fact that the social value derived from consumption (which is at least equal to
a fraction of the surplus derived from e-commerce) greatly exceeds the revenue at stake associated
with the telecommunications companies and ISP’s security levels. Since investments in Internet
security are in the control of the providers and there is little vertical integration in e-commerce,
the likelihood of underinvestments in security emerges as public policy issue that may justify some
form of regulation. In section 5, the paper concludes by discussing the difficulties associated with
designing and enforcing a regulatory scheme based upon mandatory security standards.
2 A Simple Illustrative Game
We consider a setting in which firms plan for long-term security investments taking into account
the likelihood of cyber-attacks. We restrict our attention to attacks that may cause significant
service disruption and consequently, reductions in a firm’s customer base. A firm (i.e. an ISP
or telecommunications company) that incurs an added cost F in security has a probability α of
successfully protecting itself when attacked. If a firm does not make this added investment, the
probability of a vulnerability being exploited is 1 − β (we assume α > β). Let us assume the
revenue “at stake” is denoted by V . In words, this is the revenue associated with customers that
are sensitive to security failures. Under normal operating conditions (i.e. no cyber attacks), in a
market with two symmetric firms, firms share V equally. However, when attacked and with only
one firm successfully withstanding the attack, all revenue V is accrued by this one firm.
Let R(α, β) denote firm 1’s expected revenues if only this firm invests in security. Conditional upon
successful protection, firm 1 revenues are given by:
E[R(α, β)| “firm 1 withstands attack”] =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
V with prob. 1− β
V
2 with prob. β
Let us denote by t the probability of a cyber attack. Firm 1’s expected revenue is:
R(α, β) = αt[(1− β)V + βV
2
] + (1− t)V
2
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Similarly, the expected revenue for firm 1 when only this firm does not invest in security is:
R(β, α) = βt[(1− α)V + αV
2
] + (1− t)V
2
If both firms invest in security then their expected revenue is
R(α, α) = αt[(1− α)V + αV
2
] + (1− t)V
2
Finally, if no firm invests in software, expected revenues are
R(β, β) = βt[(1− β)V + βV
2
] + (1− t)V
2
Here, a few words on the structure of the function R are warranted. First, we remark that R(α, α) >
R(β, β), i.e. expected revenues are increasing in symmetrically adopted levels of security. Also,
the expected revenue gains resulting from investments in security, i.e. R(α, ·)−R(β, ·) decrease as
competitors increase their security levels. That is;
R(α, β)−R(β, β) > R(α, α)−R(β, α)
A similar structure of revenue can also be found in the literature on competition and quality of
service (see for instance Shapiro (1983)). The basic premise of this literature is that customers
react to low levels of quality of service by switching to other providers. This effect takes place even
if quality of service is imperfectly observed, as other observables such as price and customer base,
serve as informative signals for quality.
2.1 Nash Equilibrium
After deriving the expected revenue function R, we introduce the investment game (in normal
form):
Invest Do Not
Invest (R(α,α)− F ;R(α,α)− F ) (R(α, β)− F ;R(β, α))
Do Not (R(β, α);R(α, β)− F ) (R(β, β);R(β, β))
Both firms invest in security in a Nash equilibrium iff R(α, α)− F ≥ R(β, α). That is,
αt[(1− α)V + αV
2
]− F ≥ βt[(1− α)V + αV
2
]
Or equivalently,
α
β
≥ 1 + F
V
1
βt(1− α2 )
(1)
Condition (1) simply states that the gain in security as measured by αβ must compensate the
(relative) investment cost, as measured by FV . The required compensation increases exponentially
as βt→ 0. Note also that when β is close to 1, the condition requires that αβ & 1 + 2t FV .
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If R(β, β) ≥ R(α, β)−F then in equilibrium no firm invests in security. This condition is equivalent
to:
α
β
≤ 1 + F
V
1
βt(1− β2 )
Note that
1
1− β2
<
1
1− α2
since α > β. This means that whenever
1 +
F
V
1
βt(1− β2 )
<
α
β
< 1 +
F
V
1
βt(1− α2 )
there are asymmetric equilibria where one firm invests and the other does not, as well as a symmetric
but mixed equilibrium (see Appendix 6.1).
Finally, we note that assuming risk averse players may increase the range of parameters for which
a full investment equilibrium applies. However, this effect is negligible for small values of t. For
tractability, we leave out this effect in our comparison of private vs. social incentives to invest.
2.2 Numerical Illustration
In order to illustrate the results presented above, an example is provided. Assume that two ISP
companies are competing in a geographical region for a common customer base. According to
Factiva (www.factiva.com) the national ISP market was about $50bb per year in 2003. Additionally,
ISP Planet (see www.isp-planet.com) reports that in 2005, 21 companies captured about 70% of
the national ISP market. For the example, assume each of the companies has a revenue base of
$2bb (about the average for the top companies). Assume that the revenue at stake, V, is 10% of
total revenue, $200mm. Assume that the likelihood of a credible attack, t, for both companies is
.95 over a five year period. Assume that there is an increase in cost for security to go from a β level
of protection to an alpha level of protection that is spread evenly over a five year period for a total
of $50mm (i.e., F = $50mm). For this example, we introduce a new parameter, m = 1−α1−β , where
m is the reduction in likelihood of a successful attack due to the increased investment in security,
F .
Figure 1 presents the relationship between the decision thresholds for investment in added security
(FV ) versus the required reduction in the likelihood of a successful attack (m), with β as a variable
and alpha approaching values close to 1. From Figure 1 it can be seen that if, for example, the
increased investment in security, F , will hopefully reduce the likelihood of successful attacks by
half, and if beta is .75, the decision threshold for investment in security is 6% (i.e., the five year cost
of security must be less than 6% of the revenue at stake). For the example, since the revenue at
stake is $200mm for each company, the maximum acceptable incremental cost for added security is
5
00.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
00.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.80.91
m
F/
V
Beta=0.5
Beta = 0.6
Beta = 0.7
Beta = 0.75
Beta = 0.8
Beta = 0.9
Beta = 0.95
Figure 1: FV vs. improvement in security
$12mm over 5 years. Since the incremental cost for this example is $50mm, the companies would
decline making the added investment. Note from Figure 1 that as β increases, for any given value
of improvement, m, the decision threshold decreases, so that there is a lower and lower interest in
further improvements as the level of protection increases. For example, from Figure 1, using the
example presented above, but changing β to 0.8 results in a decision threshold reduction to 4.75%,
or $9.5mm as the maximum acceptable cost for the five year period.
2.3 The Effect of More Competitors
Let us suppose we have N + 1 symmetric firms. If all firms invest in software security, a firm’s
revenue (if successfully protected), are given by
E[R(α,N)| “firm 1 withstands attack”] =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
V with prob. (1− α)N
...
V
n+1 with prob.
Ã
N
n
!
αn(1− α)N−n
...
V
N+1 with prob. α
N
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where 0 < n < N . Thus, its expected revenue is
R(α,N) = αtE[V (α,N)] + (1− t) V
N + 1
where
E[V (α,N)] =
NX
n=0
V
n+ 1
Ã
N
n
!
αn(1− α)N−n
Similarly, if firm 1 does not invest while other firms do, its expected revenue is given by:
R(β,N) = βt[E[V (α,N)] + (1− t)V
2
If R(α,N)− F ≥ R(β,N) investment by all firms is a Nash equilibrium. This condition translates
into
α
β
≥ 1 + F
E[V (α,N)]
1
βt
(2)
Note that E[V (α,N)] is monotonically decreasing in N . Hence, a larger number of competitors
weakens the incentive to invest and the condition for a Nash equilibrium in which all firms invest
becomes more stringent. In particular, for β ' 1, E[V (α,N)] ' VN+1 and condition (2) requires that
α
β & 1 + N+1t FV . This leads to the interesting result that should the number of Internet providers
rise, the orientation toward Internet security investments would likely decrease.
2.4 Numerical Illustration
In order to illustrate the results of the effects of multiple competing companies, we return to the
example of Section 2.1. Figure 2 presents the relationship between the decision thresholds for
investment in added security (FV ) versus the required reduction in the likelihood of a successful
attack (m), with β set at 0.75 and α approaching values close to 1. In Figure 2 the parameter N
is introduced to indicate how investment thresholds change with increased competition. From the
figure it can be observed that as N increases, the decision thresholds decrease. From the earlier
example involving two competitors the threshold FV was shown to be $12mm for beta equal to 0.75.
When there are four competing companies it can be seen that the decision threshold, FV reduces by
half for the same improvement value of m, to about $6mm. This serves to demonstrate that as the
ISP market becomes more and more competitive, it would follow that the investment of individual
companies in security of the Internet would be reduced.
3 Depreciation and Investment Dynamics
Let us now extend our model to capture some of the dynamic features of investments in security.
Specifically, we are interested in studying the effects of depreciation or obsolescence associated with
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Figure 2: Effect of More Competitors (N=number of competitors)
new attacks and/or new vulnerabilities being developed and/or exploited. Depreciation is a very
important aspect of cyber security, since software exploitations are continually under development
by potential attackers, and results are often posted on the Internet for others to refine into even
more enhanced attack capabilities. We shall restrict our attention to investment policies that are a
function of the current level of security as measured by the probability of successful protection (e.g.
α, in the case of investment and β, the status-quo level). In this sense, we define a “state” variable
s = (x, y) with x, y ∈ {α, β}. If the state of the system is s = (α, α) and firms do not invest in
cyber security, then with probability q ∈ (0, 1) the state variable transitions to (β, β). Likewise,
with probability 1 − q the state remains at (α, α). In words, if firms do not invest, depreciation
occurs with probability q, implying that current infrastructure in cyber security becomes outdated
(i.e. the probability of a successful attack is 1− β).
We are interested in Markovian strategy combinations that have the following property: at every
time period, for any given state, no firm can do strictly better by choosing a different decision
than the one prescribed by the strategy combination under consideration. This concept known as
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) formalizes a notion of recursive rationality, i.e. play prescribed
by the strategies from any state off the equilibrium path must also be in equilibrium (see Chapter
13 on Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Maskin and Tirole (2001)). As a refinement of Nash equi-
librium, this solution concept filters out all “non-credible” Nash equilibria, i.e., those equilibrium
strategies supported upon the basis of irrational play off the equilibrium path. A second advantage
of MPE pertains to the simplicity of Markovian strategies which substantially reduces the number
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of parameters to be estimated in dynamic econometric models (see for instance, Ericson and Pakes
(1995)). In the analysis that follows, we take an “inverse” approach to equilibrium analysis, that
is, we identify sufficient conditions for parameter values that lead to a given equilibrium strategy
combination. However, there may be parameter combinations for which multiple equlibria exist.
Let us first analyze the investment strategy in which the firms constantly update their cyber security
infrastructure (that is, they incur investment cost F at all time periods). Let v(x, y) denote firm
1’s present value of profits when firms adhere to this strategy. It follows that
v(α, α) = R(α, α)− F + γv(α, α) (3)
where γ = 11+r is the discount factor and r stands for the cost of capital. Typically for cyber
security investments the major cost of capital is opportunity costs; i.e., the use of the capital for
purposes of achieving corporate growth. this can take the form of investments in increasing sales
staff, increasing advertising, increasing R&D, etc. To check that the strategy under consideration
is an equilibrium, we consider a deviation in which firm 1 abstains from investing. In this situation,
with probability q, the state becomes (β, α) and with probability 1− q, the state becomes (α, α).
To ensure that it is not profitable for firm 1 to deviate (not investing) we must ensure the following
incentive compatibility constraint holds:
−F + γv(α,α)
≥
γ[qv(β, α) + (1− q)v(α, α)]
Note that
v(β, α) = R(β, α)− F + γv(α, α) (4)
Using (3) and (4) it can be seen that the incentive compatibility constraint is equivalent to:
α
β
≥ 1 + F
V
1
βt(1− α2 )
1 + r
q
(5)
Conditions (5) formalizes the interplay between the likelihood of depreciation or obsolescence and
the incentives to invest. The lower the likelihood of depreciation, the more stringent the compen-
sation on the relative gain of security as a function of the relative investment cost in order for a
strategy of constant updating of cyber security to be in equilibrium.
When condition (5) is not satisfied, the firms do not have the incentives to maintain a high level of
cyber security at all times. Let us consider a more flexible investment strategy under which firms
invest (i.e. update their cyber security) only when they are “outdated” (i.e. the probability of a
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Figure 3: State-transition diagram under the strategy combination in which players invest only if
cyber security infrastructure is “outdated”
successful attack is 1 − β)2. The associated “bubble” diagram in shown in Figure 3. The state
transitions can be summarized as follows:
• in state (α, α) firms do not invest and depreciation takes place with probability q leading to
state (β, β). With probability 1− q the state remains at (α, α). Thus,
v(α, α) = R(α,α) + γ[qv(β, β) + (1− q)v(α, α) (6)
• In state (β, β) firms invest and reach state (α, α) after one period. Thus,
v(β, β) = R(β, β)− F + γv(α, α) (7)
• In state (α, β), only firm 2 invests, thus with probability q firm 1’s security infrastructure
becomes outdated, i.e. the state reached is (β, α). With probability 1− q, both firms will be
“up to date” at the beginning of next period. Thus,
v(α, β) = R(α, β) + γ[qv(β, α) + (1− q)v(α, α)] (8)
2Note that investments in security can be seen as “negative” R&D: no new value is created but there is a higher
chance of incurring losses if no investment is undertaken. This analogy is limited as equilibrium in R&D can be
characterized by “leapfrogging” (see Giovannetti (2001)). This differs from the “invest when outdated” equilibrium
analyzed here.
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and:
v(β, α) = R(β, α)− F + γ[qv(α, β) + (1− q)v(α, α)] (9)
For this strategy to be in equilibrium we must check that there are no incentives to deviate. First,
when in state (α, β), we must check that there is no incentive for firm 1 to invest, that is,
−F + γv(α, α) ≤ γ[qv(β, α) + (1− q)v(α,α)]
As shown in the Appendix 6.2, this is equivalent to:
α
β
≤ 1 + F
V
1
β[1− α2 − γq(1−
β
2 )]
1 + r
qt
(10)
This condition is sufficient to ensure that investment in state (α, α) is also not profitable as long
as β > 12 (see Appendix 6.3). We finalize by checking that abstaining from investing when in state
(β, β) does not constitute a profitable deviation from the investment strategy under consideration.
The associated condition is:
γv(β, α) ≤ −F + γv(α, α)
which translates into (see Appendix 6.4)
α
β
≥ 1 + F
V
1
β[1− α2 − γq(1−
β
2 )]
1 + r
θt
(11)
where θ = [1− γ + γ(q(1− q)]−1 > 1.
Note that as q → 0, conditions (10) becomes less stringent. Intuitively, as the prospect of deprecia-
tion diminishes the incentive to invest also weakens. Conversely, as q → 0, condition (11) captures
that fact that the relative gain in security afforded by investing must increase.
4 Socially Optimal Investments
In the above analysis, we have focused on the investment incentives faced by Internet Service
Providers (ISP’s) and telecommunication companies, whose combined technology components con-
stitute the Internet. In this section, we explore optimal investments from a social standpoint. That
is, investment that maximize the difference between the expected social surplus (derived from busi-
nesses and consumers that make use of the Internet as a channel for commerce) and investment
costs.
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4.1 Back to the Simple Illustrative Game
Let us denote by S, the social value derived from Internet usage. Let W (N) denote the expected
social welfare (S + the ISP’s surplus) when a total of N ISP’s have invested in security and
N ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Under normal operating conditions (i.e. no cyber attacks) a transfer V from
consumers to the Internet Service Providers takes place. If a cyber attack takes place, this transfer
does not occur if the two firms fail.
Let p(N) denote the probability that the transfer V from consumers to producers takes place, when
N firms have invested in cyber security. Conditional upon an attack taking place, we have:
E[p(N)| “firms under attack”] = [1− (1− α)N(1− β)2−N ]
It follows that
p(N) = t[1− (1− α)N (1− β)2−N ] + (1− t)
and
W (N) = S × p(N)− F ×N
If W (2) ≥ W (1), investment by both firms is optimal from a social standpoint. This is equivalent
to
S[p(2)− p(1)] ≥ F (12)
Since p(2)− p(1) = t(1− α)(α− β) this is equivalent to:
α
β
≥ 1 + F
S
1
βt(1− α) (13)
After comparing conditions (1) and (13), we conclude:
• whenever S(1− α) > V (1− α2 ), or equivalently
S
V
> 1 +
1
2
α
1− α (14)
condition (1) is more restrictive than (13). Thus, a situation may arise under which invest-
ment by both firms is socially optimal yet it is not undertaken by both firms in equilibrium
(i.e. there may be under-investment in cyber security). In other words, under-investment in
cyber security is more likely in industries where the social value derived from consumption
substantially exceeds industry revenue and the protection probability α is not high enough.
• conversely, whenever
S
V
< 1 +
1
2
α
1− α
condition (13) is more restrictive than (1). In other words, in equilibrium there may be
over-investment in cyber security.
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4.2 Numerical Illustration
In order to illustrate the potential for under investment in Internet security by ISP’s when consid-
ered through the economic perspectives of e-commerce and other e-businesses, consider the potential
for a substantial Internet failure of the sort inspired by the discussion in Section 1 pertaining to
stolen Cisco router software. Using equation (14) above, the value of V would be the lost revenue
to ISP’s due to a substantial Internet outage. Using the Section 2.1 annual revenue assumption
for ISP’s of $50bb, an assumed Internet outage of one week, and a policy of making refunds for
downtime to customers (assumed to be 152 of annual revenue, i.e. one week out of 52), the resulting
integrated revenue loss to all ISP’s would roughly be $1bb. If for the same incident, one assumes
that there was an average 6 month loss of 1% of the Internet business market including retail sales,
business-to-business sales, advertising, etc. (total market of $1.7 tt/year for 2003 according to US
Census Bureau) due to consumer shifts to brick and mortar companies, and other lost revenue op-
portunities (e.g., one week’s loss of advertising banner revenue), S would equal $8.5bb. Accordingly,
S
V would equal 8.5. From equation (14), for α equal to 0.9 the ratio of
S
V where one could start to
expect under investment from ISP’s would be 5.5. As a result, for the scenario portrayed above,
one could anticipate that security investments would be less than the e-business community would
desire.
The result clearly depends on the assumptions of duration of outage, shifts in market, temporary
losses of markets and other difficult to predict or validate factors. Nonetheless, it seems clear that
as e-business continues to grow (e.g., according to the US Census Bureau e-commerce retail sales
have tripled over the five year period between 2000 -2005), the potential for underinvestment is
likely to grow with it, indicating that a better understanding of the elusive parameters needs to be
developed. In fact, if one accepts the premise that the Internet provides an economy of scale, then
the ratio of e-business to provider revenues will continue to grow and the liklihood of eventually
arriving at a point of security underinvestment becomes more and more likely.
4.3 Optimal Investment Dynamics
Let us assume we start from the (α,α) state. From a social standpoint, a strategy of constant
updating of cyber security infrastructure yields a expected social surplus of
W (2) + γW (2) + γ2W (2) + . . . =
W (2)
1− γ (15)
In a more flexible strategy, in which firms invest (i.e. update their cyber security) only when they
are “outdated”. Let us denote by Wα and Wβ, the welfare under the flexible strategy when the
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initial state is (α, α) and (β, β). It follows that"
Wα
Wβ
#
=
"
W (2)
W (0)
#
+ γ
"
1− q q
1 0
#"
Wα
Wβ
#
After solving this system of equations, we obtain
Wα =
W (2) + γqW (0)
1− γ(1− q(1− γ) (16)
Thus, a policy of constant updating is socially optimal whenever the value in (15) is at least equal
to the value in (16). The reader can verify that this is equivalent to W (0) ≤ W (2). A sufficient
condition for this condition is (see Appendix 6.5):
α
β
≥ 1 + F
S
1
αt(1− α) (17)
Let us now compare conditions (17) and (5). Note that if
S
V
>
β
α
1− α2
1− α
q
1 + r
the condition (5) is more stringent. Hence, for a wide range of parameters both firms will not invest
in equilibrium, while this is optimal from a social standpoint. Note also that while the condition for
social optimality of constant updating (i.e. (17)) is independent of depreciation (i.e. the probability
q), the condition for constant updating in equilibrium (i.e. (5)) is highly sensitive to depreciation.
It is therefore possible that for low values of q, both firms do not invest in equilibrium while
they should do under the socially optimal investment strategy. Another parameter that affects
individual firms’ decisions is the cost of capital r. A strategy of constant updating is less likely
to be in equilibrium, the higher the cost of capital r. This parameter does not play a role in
determining whether such an investment strategy is optimal from a social standpoint.
5 Implications for Regulatory Policy
We have presented a game-theoretic model of investments in security by Internet Service Providers.
The model sheds light on the conditions for a “market failure” in the sense of under-investment
in equilibrium. On the one hand, as shown through the examples, plausible parameter values lead
to a conclusion of underinvestment by Internet providers. On the other hand, these parameters
can be adjusted so that the conclusion is that Internet providers adequately invest in security.
Thus, further empirical research is necessary at this point to be able to ascertain the validity of
our model. However, if the ratio of social value to revenue at stake to Internet providers continued
to grow, underinvestment in security becomes more and more likely. Consequently, some form of
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regulation may eventually become necessary. Any proposed regulatory scheme must address the
unique features of the provision of Internet security: 1) the inability to measure levels of security,
2) the impacts of continuing malicious attempts and associated learning curve of potential cyber
attackers to identify weaknesses in existing security, including the potential for insider as well
as outsider attacks, 3) the potentially high costs for implementing security that are related to
integration with existing systems that vary from company to company, 4) the ranking of security
risks that are dependent on the system designs that vary from company to company, 5) the wide
variation in the technical and financial readiness to financially support security of companies that
support the Internet infrastructure.
5.1 Measuring Security
Risk analysts (see for instance, Haimes (2005)) point to the fundamental measurements of risk
being identified by the following three questions that serve to measure risk: 1) What can go
wrong?, 2) What are the consequences?, and 3) What are the likelihoods? For cyber attacks, the
information technology community has developed and matured techniques for identifying system
vulnerabilities that can potentially be exploited by attackers. However, little data is available to
help in the determination of the likelihoods of a particular attack, both with and without additional
security measures. Furthermore, these likelihoods vary with time, as potential attackers learn about
protective technologies and eventually may be able to exploit existing weaknesses. With regard
to consequences of cyber attacks, the cyber security community recognizes that they can take on
many dimensions whose values vary from company to company. For example loss of reputation, loss
of money, legal liabilities, loss of intellectual property, etc. can all be consequences of an attack,
and different companies place different values on these consequences. As a result, regulation would
need to be built upon approaches that deal with these complexities.
5.2 Learning Curve for Cyber Attacks
Cyber attackers typically derive exploiting software through trial and error based developments.
As a result, one can expect the answers to the risk analysis questions presented above to vary with
time. However, existing data does not support the derivation of depreciation factors for protec-
tion software, resulting in an important uncertainty in decisions related to selection of security
solutions. In addition, the possibility of insider attacks can include insiders from the software
provider companies as well as the companies seeking protection, resulting in significant uncertainty
in decision-making about security. Section 4 above discusses depreciation rate for security technol-
ogy as a important variable. It can be seen that an error in knowing the depreciation rate can lead
to significant errors in cost estimation. While in some cases the security vendors suffer the costs, if
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errors in predicting depreciation are large, one can reasonably expect a less aggressive activity by
them in response to problems, and ultimately expected price increases.
5.3 Security Integration into Systems
The risks of a cyber attack discussed above depend on the design of the information system being
attacked as well as the security solutions that are a part of the system. When one combines the
system design variations that exist from company to company with the variable costs for integration
of security solutions with the varying measurement parameters that are part of security, it becomes
clear that there would be great difficulty in finding universally agreed upon security needs that
would be preemptive. As a result one can expect that the regulations would likely be driven toward
being responsive to historical attacks as opposed to focusing on future high risk possibilities.
5.4 Industrial Readiness
The Internet is provided by a wide range of companies when measured by size or technical capability.
For example the companies that are Internet registrars under the Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) can be very small compared to the largest ISP’s that are multi-
billion dollar companies. This size variation typically brings with it less of an internal staff with
the required skills and experience to focus on cyber security as a special area of business concern,
as well as less of a budget to focus on the implementation of security solutions. This issue of size
differences is highlighted in a scoping study conducted by the National Research Council of the
National Academies (2003) as a major factor in considering possible regulation of cyber security in
the freight transportation area.
6 Conclusions
We have presented a game-theoretic model that addresses the economic motivations for investment
in added Internet security and makes a case for a possible market failure in the form of underinvest-
ment in the provision of Internet security. This result relies on the fact that the social value derived
from Internet use (which is at least equal to a fraction of the surplus derived from e-commerce)
greatly exceeds the revenue at stake associated with the telecommunications companies’ and ISP’s
security levels. While further empirical research is necessary at this point to be able to ascertain
the validity of our model and given the scant level of vertical integration in e-commerce, it seems
plausible that the ratio of social value of Internet use to revenue at stake to Internet providers will
continue to grow. Thus, underinvestment in security becomes more and more likely. Consequently,
if in the near future, vertical integration in e-commerce does not take place, some form of regulation
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may eventually become necessary and will very likely be “process oriented”: i.e., Internet provider
companies would need to produce a standardized analysis of security risks that identifies and ranks
risks from their users’ perspective and propose investment plans to mitigate these risks. While we
can not predict the future needs for such regulation, this paper points to the pressing need for more
research on these issues.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Derivation of Mixed-strategy equilibrium
Let p the probability with which a player is to invest in equilibrium. Indifference requires:
pR(α, α) + (1− p)R(α, β)− F
=
pR(β, α) + (1− p)R(β, β)
After algebraic manipulation, the reader can verify that p ∈ (0, 1) is such that
α
β
= 1 +
F
V
1
βt[p(1− α2 ) + (1− p)(1−
β
2 )]
7.2 Derivation of (10)
The required condition can be rewritten as:
γq[v(α, α)− v(β, α)] ≤ F (A.1)
Using (6) and (9) we obtain
v(α, α)− v(β, α) = t(α− β)(1− α
2
)V + F + γq[v(β, β)− v(α, β)]
Similarly, using (7) and (9)
v(β, β)− v(α, β) = t(β − α)(1− β
2
)V − F + γq[v(α, α)− v(β, α)]
Thus, A.1 can be rewritten as
γqt(α− β)[(1− α2 )− γq(1−
β
2 )]V
1− γ2q2 ≤
F
1 + γq
This equivalent to
γqt(α− β)[(1− α2 )− γq(1−
β
2 )]V
1− γq ≤ F
7.3 Sufficiency of (10) when in (α, α)
We must check that
−F + γv(α, α) ≤ γ[qv(β, β) + (1− q)v(α, α)]
Since
v(α, α)− v(β, β) =
t(α− β)(1− α+β2 )V + F
1 + γq
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the above condition is thus equivalent to
α
β
≤ 1 + F
V
1
β[1− α+β2 )]
1 + r
qt
Hence, condition (10) is more restrictive provided β > 12 .
7.4 Derivation of (11)
The condition γv(β, α) ≤ −F + γv(α, α) is equivalent to:
γ [v(α, α)− v(β, α)] ≥ F
From before we know
γ [v(α, α)− v(β, α)] =
γt(α− β)[(1− α2 )− γq(1−
β
2 )]V
1− γ2q2 +
γF
1 + γq
7.5 Derivation of (16)
The condition W (0) ≤W (2) is equivalent to
p(0) ≤ p(2)− 2F
S
(A.2)
which in turn is equivalent to:
t[1− (1− β)2] + 2F
S
≤ t[1− (1− α)2]
We now use the fact that for f(x) = x2, convexity implies
f(y) ≥ f(x) + f 0(x)(y − x)
Let y = 1− β and x = 1− α, thus
(1− β)2 ≥ (1− α)2 + 2(1− α)(α− β)
It follows that a sufficient condition for (A.2) to hold is
t[1− (1− β)2] + 2F
S
≤ t[1− (1− β)2] + 2t(1− α)(α− β)
After some algebraic manipulation, condition (16) is obtained.
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